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OSGOODE HALL LAW JORRNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JURISDICTION OF O.L.R.B. - R. v. O.L.R.B.
Ex P. DUNN.
The problem for determination before the Court was whether
the jurisdiction over the labour relations of a subsidiary wholly owned
by, and producing mainly for a company whose labour relations are
governed by tie Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act1
was sufficiently integral to the operation of that company to come
also within the Federal jurisdiction.
An application for certification was made to the Ontario Labour
Relations Board by the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers
of.America with respect to certain employees of Northern Electric
Co. Ltd. at its Bramalea plant. A dispute as to the jurisdiction of the
Board arose, and an application was made to the High Court for
an order or prohibition against the Board.
At the time of the litigation Bell Telephone Co. owned 99%
of the shares of Northern Electric and a large percentage of its pro-
duction was sold to the Bell Co. The Bramalea plant of Northern
Electric was exclusively devoted to the manufacture of crossbar auto-
matic switching equipment. 95% of the plant's production was sold
to the Bell Co., and 100% of such components used by the Bell Co.
were produced at the Bramalea plant.
Chief Justice McRuer held that the Ontario Labour Relations
Board had jurisdiction.2 Labour relations are prima facie matters of
property and civil rights.3 However, the Parliament of Canada has
competence to enact collective bargaining legislation to govern the
labour relations of employees whose operations fall within the works,
undertakings, business or activities coming within the classes of sub-
jects assigned by the B.N.A. Act to Parliament. In the words of Mr.
Justice Estey:
This jurisdiction of parliament to so legislate includes those situations
in which labour and labour relations are (a) an integral part of or
necessarily incidental to the headings enumerated under S. 91; (b) in
respect to Dominion Government employees; (c) in respect to works
and undertakings under S. 91(29) and S. 92(10); (d) in respect of works,
undertakings or business in Canada but outside of any province.4
The Dominion Parliament has enacted legislation to cover these
situations. The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act
provides:
53. Part 2 applies in respect of employees who are employed upon or
in connection with the operation of any work, undertaking or business
that is within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada In-
cluding, but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing,
(b) railways, canals, telegraphs and other works or undertakings con-
necting a province with any other or others of the provinces, or extending
beyond the limits of a province.
1 R.S.C. 1952, c. 152, s. 53.
2 R?. v. O.L.R.B. ex p. Dunn, [1963) 2 O.R. 301, 39 D.L.R. (2d) 346. Cita-
tions below refer to report in the D.L.R.
3 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925J A.C. 396.
4 Reference re Industrial Relations, etc., [1955) S.C.R. 529, 564.
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(g) such works and undertakings as, although wholly situate within a
province, are before or after their execution declared by the Parliament
of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage
of two or more of the provinces.
The words "in connection with" are construed to include no more
than that which would form an integral part or be necessarily inci-
dental to the work, undertaking or business within Parliament's
competence.5
The Bell Co. is governed by the Industrial Relations and Disputes
Investigation Act, its operation being within S. 92(10), B.N.A. Act,
1867. The question as to whether the operation of Northern Electric
was integral to the operation of the Bell Telephone system was decided
in the negative.6
In approaching this question, the Chief Justice stated:
The determination of the matter before me is not one confined to ab-
stract discussions of authorities on constitutional law and decided
cases. The matter requires proof of facts to show within what jurisdic-
tion the relationship of Northern Electric and its employees at the
Bramalea plant falls.7
Before discussing the "tests" used in holding the Bramalea opera-
tion was not integral to the operation of the Bell Co., some comment
seems required on S. 4 of the amending Act s to the act of incorporation
of the Bell Company.
4. The said Act of incorporation as hereby amended, and the works
thereunder authorized, are hereby declared to be for the general ad-
vantage of Canada.
The Chief Justice followed some dicta of Lord Macnaughton in
City of Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada9 that the declaration
for general advantage is meaningless with respect to the Bell Co. in
that it is a company coming within S. 92(10) (a)' 0 and therefore is
not a work "wholly situate within the Province". But is this declara-
tion of general advantage really superfluous at all? As pointed out
by Lord Reid in C.P.R. v. A.G. B.C. and A.G. Can.:" "A company
may be authorized to carry on, and may in fact carry on, more than
one undertaking."12
If one looks to the powers of the Bell Co. as set out in the
amended Act,' 3 it is seen that the company has more than the power
to operate and acquire telephone communications systems, but has
the power to manufacture telephones and other equipment connected
therewith.
2. The said company shall have the power to manufacture telephones
and other apparatus connected therewith, and their appurtenances and
5 Supra, footnote 4, per Estey, J., 566.
6 Supra, footnote 2, 359.
7 Ibid. 354.
8 Statutes of Canada, 1882, c. 95.
9 [1905] A.C. 52, 60.
10 Supra, footnote 2.
11 [1950 A.C. 122.
12 Ibid., 143.
13 Supra, footnote 8.
1964]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JORRNAL
other instruments, and in connection with the business of a telegraph or
telephone company, and also such other electrical instruments and
plant as the said company may deem advisable and to purchase, sell
or lease the same rights relating thereto ...
In the C.P.R. case, it was held that the Empress Hotel was not
part of the company's railway works and, therefore, was not within
S. 92(10) (a). Nor was the hotel within S. 92(10) (c) because the
declaration of general advantage in S. 2(2) The Railway Act, 192714
extended only to "railways" and it was held that the hotel did not
come within that definition.
By the words of S. 2 of the amending Act, Bell Co. has the right
and the power to operate a manufacturing plant for producing tele-
phone components. The jurisdiction in respect to the labour relations
of such a plant would likely meet the fate of the Empress Hotel, if the
general declaration in S. 4 did not include "and the works thereunder
authorized". For these reasons the writer submits that the declara-
tion of general advantage for Canada in S. 4 is not meaningless.
However, the question whether a declaration of general advantage
within S. 92(10) (c) may be made in broad generic terms i.e., a class
of works, or as to specify particular works, still remains an open
constitutional question.' 5
In arriving at his decision, three considerations seemed to have
been applied: (1) that this was a manufacturing operation; 16 (2) that
if Northern Electric ceased such production a substituted manufac-
turer could produce the particular unit;17 and (3) the Court will not
deal with facts to the extent of examining the destination of output.'8
The writer disputes the soundness of these "tests" for determin-
ing whether an operation is indeed "sufficiently integral". Should dif-
ferent principles apply where one corporate entity happens to be a
manufacturing company and another a stevedoring company? 19 Is
not the purpose of the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act, to provide machinery at a national level for arbitration and
conciliation of labour disputes which could severely interfere with a
Dominion interest? Surely a strike in a manufacturing company
producing a unit which happens to be integral to the operation of the
Bell system would be within the scope-the purpose-of the legisla-
tion, just as much as a strike by the Eastern Canada Stevedoring Co.
Ltd.20 Yet the situation in Reference re Industrial Relations, etc.21
was distinguished on this basis:
14 R.S.C. 1927, c. 170.
'5 Luscar Collieries v. McDonald, [1927] A.C. 925, 933. See also article
by Phineas Schwartz, Fiat by Declaration, 2 O.H.L.J. 1.
16 Supra, footnote 2, 357.
17 Ibid., 357.
Is Ibid., 359.





It seems to me that it is a very different thing to seek to apply the
principles of that case to a manufacturing operation whereby articles
that are produced by a subsidiary company are used in telephone com-
munication.22
Yet it seems that in questions as to whether there is in fact inter-
provincial or international trade within the Trade and Commerce
clause of S. 91, B.N.A. Act, there is no differentiation of principles
applied. Mr. Justice Rand sets up a test:
That demarcation must observe this rule, that if in a trade activity,
including manufacture or production, there is involved a matter of extra-
provincial interest or concern its regulation thereafter in the aspect of
trade is by that fact put beyond Provincial power. 23
It would seem strange that there should be a differentiation on
the basis of manufacturing when trying the question as to whether in
fact an operation is integral to the operation of the company governed
by the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act.
One of the reasons the Chief Justice used this manufacturing
test was based on his interpretation of C.P.R. v. A.G.B.C. and A.G.
Can.2A
The principles of the C.P.R. case do not permit me to bring the proceess
of manufacturing articles by a subsidiary of the Bell Company within
the ambit of S. 4.25
The C.P.R. case can be distinguished in that the keeping of
hotels was held to be a separate undertaking on the part of the C.P.R.
not within S. 92(10) (a), and that this aspect of their undertaking
was not within the declaration of general advantage in the Railway
Act which only extended to railways. As has been pointed out, in
the case of the Bell Co., the declaration of general advantage applied
to all the works authorized under the amendment Act of incorporation.
Thus, even though a manufacturing operation on the part of the Bell
Co. would be a separate undertaking, it would still be within the
declaration of general advantage. It is submitted that there is no
authority in fact or law in the C.P.R. case that precluded this Court
from finding of fact that the manufacturing operation of Northern
Electric was sufficiently integral to the Bell Telephone system as
to come within the Federal jurisdiction.
After pointing out that the operation at the Bramalea plant was
manufacturing, the Chief Justice then stated:
The manufacturing of crossbars at the Bramalea plant does not neces-
sarily become an integral part of telephone communication because they
are purchased and used by the Bell Company. The process of manufacture
could be carried on by any other company, or crossbars could be pur-
chased, no doubt, in many countries of the world if Northern Electric
ceased to manufacture them.26
22 Supra, footnote 2, 357.
23 Reference re The Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198, 210.
24 [1950] A.C. 122.
25 Supra, footnote 2, 359.
26 upra, footnote 2, 357.
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Just the possibility that another company could be substituted
to do the same operation does not cause that operation to cease to
be an integral part of a system. Could not some other stevedoring
company have equally well carried on the business of servicing the
same steamship lines if the Eastern Canada Stevedoring Co. had
ceased to operate? Yet in that case it was held that the Industrial
Relations and Disputes Act applied.2 It seems that the Privy Council
has taken an approach which differs from this substitution test.
In .M.T. (Eastern) Ltd. v. Winner2s the Privy Council was required
to determine whether a Provincial Act had any application to a motor
bus system that operated from Massachusetts through New Brunswick
to a destination in Nova Scotia. The respondent carried not only
through passengers on his system but also transported passengers
between intermediate points, including points entirely within the
bounds of New Brunswick. The argument that there were two sepa-
rate undertakings - one interprovincial and one provincial - was
answered thus:
The question is not what portion of the undertaking can be stripped
from it without interfering with the activity altogether; it is rather what
is the undertaking which is in fact carried on.29
It is submitted that "stripping" and "substitution" are analogous,
and therefore the possibility of substitution ought not to be a test at
all. American courts, in applying their National Labour Relations
Act, have held that it is immaterial that should operations cease,
substitute services might be obtained elsewhere.30
In his approach to the problem the Chief Justice stated that the
issue before the Court was to be determined on the facts. However,
his concluding words leave the impression that only some facts are
to be considered:
If I adopted the argument of the applicant it seems to me that this
result would follow: in every case that comes before the Ontario Labour
Relations Board there must be a minute examination of the output of
the company to see what the destination of that output is. The adoption
of the principle contended for by the applicant in my view would create
chaos in the administration of the Ontario Labour Relations Act.31
The writer can see no reason why chaos would be created. Even
in this case where, as the Chief Justice points out, the evidence was
very deficient, the information that was before the Court consisted
mainly of information regarding percentages and distribution of the
output of the Bramalea plant. The information was neither confusing
nor complicated. The writer does not suggest that such percentages
should be the determining factor, but it is submitted that such figures
should at least be a factor in the consideration of the Court.
27 Supra, footnote 4.
28 (1954), 13 W.W.R. (N.S.) 657.
29 Ibid., 679.
30 N.L.R.B. v. Bank of America National Trust and Saving Ass'n., 130
F. (2d) 624, 63 S. Ct. 992, 318 U.S. 791.
31 Supra, footnote 2, 359.
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Indeed there is Canadian caselaw where percentages, figures, and
destination of produce were definitely factors in the consideration of
the Court when determining questions of jurisdiction. In the case
In Re The Grain Marketing Act, 193132 the Saskatchewan Legislature
had passed the Grain Marketing Act which established the Sas-
katchewan Grain Co-operative and constituted it the agent of the
growers with the exclusive right to sell all grain grown in Saskat-
chewan and destined to be marketed either within or without the
province. Evidence was introduced to show:
(1) That Canada exports annually about 270,000,000 bushels of wheat
and flour; (2) that 60% of the Canadian wheat crop is grown in Saskat-
chewan; (3) (inferentially) that by far the greater part of Saskatchewan
wheat is exported from the province; and (4) that, of the quantity
exported, 15% is consumed in Canada and 85% in Great Britain and in
foreign countries. 33
The evidence established that the great majority of the grain
grown in Saskatchewan was exported to other provinces or foreign
countries. The scheme was struck down as ultra vires on the ground
that it was directed mainly to "Trade and Commerce".
In a recent Saskatchewan case,34 lack of evidence in regard to a
company's operation and connection with Eldorado Mining, caused
the failure on behalf of Bachmeier Diamond Co. to successfully dispute
the jurisdiction of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board. Eldo-
rado is a Crown corporation incorporated for the purpose of refining
and treating uranium ore under the Atomic Energy Control Act, and
declared by such Act to be a work for the general advantage of
Canada. It was held that the fact that the appellant was under a
contract to the Crown corporation did not in itself render its activities
sufficiently integral to fall under Federal jurisdiction. But it was
pointed out that the lack of evidence demonstrating that the drilling
done by the Bachmeier Co. was an integral part of the producing, re-
fining or treatment of uranium ore, was fatal to their application.
Surely such information would include statistics on what the operation
was, the necessity of exploration, and to what extent drilling was
required in a mining operation.
In the absence of some evidence to establish this position, it is impos-
sible for me to say that the work of the applicant company is such as
to bring it within the ambit of the Federal legislation . ..35
Again the use of statistics in determining jurisdiction was demon-
strated in the Reference re The Farm Products Marketing Act.
3 6
The jurisdiction depended upon whether the products were sold or
were intended for sale within the province or, whether some of them
32 [1931] 2 W.W.R. 146 (Sask. C. of A.).
33 Ibid., 147.34 Bachmeier Diamond v. Beaverlodge, (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 241.
35 Ibid., 244.
36 (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257.
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were sold or were intended for sale beyond provincial limits. In the
words of the Chief Justice of Canada:
It is, I think, impossible to fix any minimum proportion of such last
mentioned sales (Wiz.: sales beyond the province) or intended sales as
determining the jurisdiction of Parliament.37
The American position on this point is stated in N.L.R.B. v.
F/ainbZatt. It was there pointed out that no restrictions on the
National Labour Relations Board's jurisdiction are to be determined
or fixed exclusively by reference to the volume of interstate com-
merce involved, except insofar as the maxim de minimis applies.
But note that such information is definitely a factor that American
courts consider in a situation like this case.
For these reasons, the writer submits that in future problems
regarding jurisdiction in labour relations, the courts of our Canadian
jurisdictions should not follow the "tests" that seem to have been
applied in this case.
H. JAMES BLAKE*
LANDLORD AND TENANT - BREACH OF COVENANT FOR QUIET ENJOY-
IENT - OWEN V. GADD AND KENNY V. PREEN - For some time it
seemed to be settled in English and Canadian law that in order to
succeed in an action for breach of an express or implied covenant for
quiet enjoyment contained in a lease, the lessee had to establish a
substantial interference of a direct and physical character with the
enjoyment of the demised premises, for which the lessor was respon-
sible.1 The meaning and efficacy of this test have been considered
recently by the English Court of Appeal in Owen v. Gadd2 and Kenny
v. Preen3 The purpose of this comment is to examine the background
and basis of the test and the effect of these decisions upon it.
The first stage in the development of the test was a series of
decisions in which it was held that there must be a substantial inter-
ference with the enjoyment of the demised premises. In Sanderson
v. The Mayor &c, of Berwick-upon-Tweed,4 there was a series of
drains on adjoining farms. The defendant let one farm to the plaintiff
and another on a higher level to a tenant who improperly used the
drains with the result that the plaintiff's land was flooded. The court
held that there was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.
37 Ibid., 264.
3s 59 S. Ct. 668, 306 U.S. 601, 307 U.S. 609. See also N.L.R.B. v. Townsend,
185 F. 2d 378, 71 S. Ct. 621, 341 U.S. 909.
*Mr. Blake is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 Woodfall-Law of Landlord and Tenant, 629 (26th ed. 1960).
2 [19561 2 Q.B. 99.
3 [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1233.
4 [18841 13 Q.B.D. 547.
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